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Abstract 
One line of research finds the size of the deficit to be positively correlated with 
the number of political actors. This ‘political fragmentation’ hypothesis has been 
tested on OECD countries. We successfully replicate Volkerink and de Haan’s 
(2001) model on an OECD sample. However, when we add ten non-OECD 
countries, the effect of political fragmentation disappears. We argue that the 
importance of political fragmentation varies according to the institutionalization 
of political systems. When we interact the age of a democracy with political 
fragmentation, we find that legislative fractionalisation increases the budget 
deficit as a democracy becomes more institutionalised. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is now a considerable body of work that views fiscal performance as an 
example of the common-pool resource problem. One line of research focuses on 
the political fragmentation hypothesis. Given finite resources and in the absence 
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of a central co-ordinator, opportunistic actors will seek to maximise their 
individual benefit and externalise the overall cost to the group as a whole. From 
this perspective, the size of the budget deficit is positively correlated with the 
number of politically relevant actors. So, Roubini and Sachs (1989) demonstrated 
that, all else equal, coalition governments are associated with greater deficit 
spending than single-party governments. Kontopolous and Perotti (1999) 
showed that the number of spending ministers affects the level of the budget 
deficit. De Haan, Sturm and Beekhuis (1999) stressed the number of parties in 
government: the greater the number of parties, the higher the central 
government debt-to-GDP ratio. Volkerink and de Haan (2001) confirmed that the 
number of ministers was significant and showed that the government’s level of 
parliamentary support was also a determinant. These studies share the intuition 
that fiscal performance can be explained using a common-pool resource 
approach. They test this intution on a panel of OECD countries and they all find  
some evidence to support the political fragmentation hypothesis. However, these 
studies vary in terms of the political variables they stress. Moreover, the models 
are always highly sensitive to the sample of countries chosen and the time period 
under consideration. 
In this paper, we aim to determine whether there is evidence to support 
the political fragmentation hypothesis when it is applied to both OECD and non-
OECD countries. Given that the approach is based on a general theory, then there 
should be evidence to support it. To this end, we apply Volkerink and de Haan’s 
(2001) model of fragmented government and fiscal performance to a panel of 
OECD and non-OECD democracies. We begin by replicating their study on a 
panel of OECD countries. Consistent with their study, we confirm the finding 
that the larger the number of spending ministers the lower the budget surplus. 
We then add twelve new countries to our sample, ten of them long-standing 
democracies from outside the OECD. When we do so, none of the measures of 
fragmented government approaches statistical significance. Thus, we have a 
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puzzle. Why does a model based on a general theory apply to one set of 
countries but not another? Since we have included a battery of socio-economic 
controls we argue that the essential difference between the two samples is 
political. We think that the level of overall institutionalization explains the 
differential importance of measures of political fragmentation in the two 
samples. We test this hypothesis by interacting the political fragmentation 
variables with the age of the democracy, which is our proxy for 
institutionalization. In so doing, we find that legislative fractionalization reduces 
the budget surplus, in line with the theory. 
Overall, we contribute to the existing literature by demonstrating that the 
political fragmentation hypothesis applies beyond just a group of rich long-
standing democracies. Like previous studies, our findings are sensitive to sample 
composition. However, unlike previous studies, we provide an explanation as to 
why our results are sensitive to the sample of countries. Thus, we demonstrate 
how to take account of political factors when extending a general theory from 
one context to another quite different context. 
 
2. The debate 
 
In the standard neo-classical model, public debt varies as a function of temporary 
increases in government spending, for example during wartime, and as counter-
cyclical responses to changing government income (Barro 1979). While there was 
some empirical support for this model, the debt crisis in OECD countries in the 
late 1970s and 1980s suggested that the explanatory power of the standard model 
was limited (Roubini and Sachs 1989). In response, alternative models of public 
debt emerged. Common to these models is that fiscal performance can be seen as 
an example of the tragedy of the commons, or a common-pool resource problem. 
Velasco (2000, 122) has formalised this model and described it as follows: 
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If we move beyond the view of government as a monolithic entity 
that behaves like a single individual, economics must provide an 
account of how economic decisions are made among government 
groups, and how politics both frames and determines those 
decisions … [G]overnment net income is a ‘commons’ from which 
interest groups can extract resources. This setup has striking 
macroeconomic implications. Transfers are higher than a 
benevolent planner would choose them to be; fiscal deficits emerge 
even when there are no reasons for intertemporal smoothing, and in 
the long run government debt tends to be excessively high … 
This approach to the study of public debt has become popular. In a recent 
literature review, Alt (2002, 160) sees the common-pool resource problem as one 
of two approaches that have dominated theoretical research on the fiscal effects 
of institutions. For Alt, the core intuition of this approach is that “politicians 
spend more on their constituencies to the extent that they do not internalize the 
full costs of their spending and taxing decisions. Multiplicity … matters in this 
model. Competition between claimants on the budget generates a spending bias 
because each of n claimants internalizes on 1/n of the cost of financing an 
additional unit of spending” (ibid). In short, much of the contemporary work on 
budget deficits relies explicitly or implicitly on assumptions consistent with a 
common-pool resource approach.  
 There is now a considerable amount of empirical support for the common-
pool resource approach to the study of public debt. These studies are 
underpinned by a common theoretical intuition, but there is disagreement as to 
which political institutional variables best capture cross-national and 
intertemporal variations in public debt. In the earlier work, Roubini and Sachs 
(1989) focused on the impact of coalition versus single-party government. They 
argued that tough decisions to reduce the level of public debt were likely to be 
more difficult to achieve under coalition governments than single-party 
governments. This became known as the ‘weak government’ hypothesis. While 
this argument was not framed in the context of a common-pool problem, it is 
entirely consistent with it. Using a power dispersion index that captured whether 
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or not there was a coalition and, if so, the number of parties comprising the 
coalition, they tested their hypothesis on 14 OECD countries from 1960 to 1985 
and found supporting evidence. 
Subsequent work on the weak government hypothesis was less 
supportive and different political variables were stressed. For example, using a 
corrected version of the power dispersion index and using data on a sample of 21 
OECD countries from 1982 to 1992, de Haan and Sturm (1997) failed to reject a 
null hypothesis of no difference between coalition and single-party governments. 
In subsequent work, de Haan, Sturm and Beekhuis (1999) further confirmed that 
there was little evidence to support the weak government hypothesis. At the 
same time, on the basis of a sample of 21 OECD countries from 1979 to 1995, they 
found support for what they termed a ‘size fragmentation’ hypothesis. Again, 
while de Haan, Sturm and Beekhuis did not frame their hypothesis explicitly in 
the form of a common-pool problem, the theoretical exposition of their model is 
entirely consistent with it (ibid, 165). They found that there was a positive 
correlation between the number of parties in government and the size of the 
public sector deficit measured in terms of central government’s debt-to-GDP 
ratio. 
For their part, Crain and Muris (1995, 311) explicitly referred to the 
common-pool problem. Based on a study of US state legislatures, they found 
(ibid, 326) that revenues were higher in states that merged spending and taxation 
authority in a single committee compared to  those that dispersed authority 
across a number of committees. They also found (ibid, 328) that expenditure was 
higher in legislatures where spending authority was spread across multiple 
committees rather than where it was centralised in one committee. 
 A further size fragmentation hypothesis was developed by Perotti and 
Kontopolous (2002). Interestingly, they explicitly placed their contribution in the 
context of the common-pool resource problem (ibid, 195). They used a panel of 
19 OECD countries in the period 1970-95 and adopted a slightly different 
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definition of the budget deficit than de Haan, Sturm and Beekhuis (1999). On this 
basis, Perotti and Kontopolous found that there was a strong and robust 
correlation between cabinet size – the number of spending ministers in the 
government – and the budget deficit. Perotti and Kontopolous also found some 
support for the relationship between the number of parties in the government 
coalition and the budget deficit, but only in certain models and to a lesser degree 
of significance than the finding for the number of spending ministers. 
 In subsequent work, the significance of the number of spending ministers 
has been confirmed. In particular, Volkerink and de Haan (2001) used a panel of 
22 OECD countries for the period 1971 to 1996 and confirmed that size 
fragmentation matters for the budget deficit measured, as per their previous 
study, and in contrast to the measure used by Perotti and Kontopolous, by the 
budget deficit-to-GDP ratio of central government. Thus, the number of 
spending ministers appears to be an important determinant of government debt. 
In addition, they found support for another variable consistent with a common-
pool resource problem. Specifically, they hypothesised that there would be a 
correlation between the government’s parliamentary majority and the budget 
deficit: the greater the government’s majority, the lower the deficit/higher the 
surplus. The intuition here is that as the number of excess majority seats rises, the 
bargaining power of coalition parties decreases. Again, there was some, albeit 
limited, empirical support for this hypothesis. 
 This review has demonstrated that the logic of the common-pool resource 
problem has underpinned either explicitly or implicitly much of the recent work 
on the political sources of fiscal performance. It has also shown that there is 
considerable empirical support for the political fragmentation hypothesis. 
However, the review has demonstrated that there is disagreement as to which 
political variables are relevant to fiscal performance. It has also demonstrated 
that time and time again the results are sensitive to the measurement of the 
variables as well as period and country selections. Finally, the review has 
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indicated that work on the political fragmentation hypothesis has relied almost 
entirely on evidence from OECD countries. To date, the only studies based on 
evidence outside the OECD remain Jones et al.’s (2000) study of Argentina, Stein 
et al.’s (1999) study of Latin America and Woo’s global study (2003). 
In this article, we wish to determine whether or not the the political 
fragmentation hypothesis applies to both OECD countries and long-standing 
non-OECD democracies. In theory, it should; after all, the common-pool resource 
problem is a general problem rather than a region-specific problem. If it does, 
then this would reinforce the policy recommendation that usually flows from the 
common-pool resource approach, namely that budgetary processes should be 
reformed so as to establish a hierarchical system in which the Finance Minister 
can set the budgetary agenda and enforce collective decisions (Hallerberg and 
von Hagen 1999, 214-216). If budgetary decisions can be delegated to a single, 
central figure, such as the Finance Minister, then the costs of spending can be 
more effectively internalised among the set of spending ministers and, assuming 
adherence to collective decisions can be enforced, the basic prisoner’s dilemma at 
work in the budgetary negotiation game can be resolved (Alesina and Poterba 
1999). In the next section, we specify the model we wish to test. 
 
3. Data 
 
Our population is defined by a single criterion: democracy. The indicators of 
political fragmentation are essentially measures of executive and legislative 
institutions. In democratic states, it seems likely that these institutions are 
responsible for economic decision-making. In undemocratic states, such 
institutions sometimes do not exist and, when they do, they are often supplanted 
by other, especially informal, decision-making systems (Helmke and Levitsky 
2004). We use Freedom House’s “Free” classification as our proxy for democracy 
(Freedom House. 2005). This is a widely used indicator of democracy in both 
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economics and political science (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Persson and 
Tabellini 2003). It is based on an extensive list of political and civil rights. 
Crucially, it assesses the presence of actual rights, not just legal rights or 
institutions.1 We include states in our population if they were continuously 
classified as “Free” from 1994 or earlier until 2005. This period of ten years 
entails at least two general elections in most states. This criterion gives us 27 
OECD states and 40 non-OECD states, Mexico and Slovakia being OECD 
members but not having a continuous “Free” rating. 
Our sample includes all democracies for which we could find ten 
observations without missing data. This criterion eliminates three quarters of our 
non-OECD states. Many of the non-OECD states for which we could not get 
sufficient data are microstates. In addition, Hungary, Poland, and South Korea 
are eliminated from the OECD sample. Since many of our measures are derived 
from the 2004 version of the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions we 
begin our observations in 1975 (Beck, et al 2001). Thus, our dataset consists of an 
unbalanced panel of 34 states between 1975 and 2004. This is a much larger and 
more diverse dataset than the narrow OECD sample on which the vast majority 
of the existing empirical literature is based. The ten-year democracy criterion 
ensures that it is also an appropriate sample. 
We replicate the literature on the OECD using Volkerink and de Haan’s 
(2001) article as a benchmark. They identify three groups of variables. 
The first group of variables comprises measures of the size fragmentation 
of government. This can be thought of in terms of parties and ministers. 
Volkerink and de Haan use the effective number of parties in government, while 
                                                 
1 One criterion it does not include is the necessity of a democratic turnover of 
government (For example, see Przeworski et al. 2000, 23-28). Two of our sample 
states, Botswana and Namibia, do not meet this criterion. However, the exclusion 
of either of these countries does not change our results. 
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we employ Rae’s (1971) fractionalistion index to the number and size of parties in 
government. 

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where N is the number of parties in the government, and p is the proportion of 
seats held by party i. We obtained this measure from the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI), with some supplementary research to fill in a small number of 
missing observations.   
Another measure of size fragmentation is the number of spending 
ministers. Like Volkerink and de Haan, we count all ministers excluding the 
finance minister and prime minister. While their source is Woldendorp, Keman 
and Budge (Woldendorp, et al. 1993; 1998), we have counted the ministers 
ourselves using Keesing’s online (http://www.keesings.com/).2 
The second group of variables comprises measures of legislative 
fragmentation. One such measure is the division between government legislators 
and others. Like Volkerink and de Haan, we use a scaled measure of the 
government’s excess seats in parliament. Volkerink and de Haan also include the 
effective number of parliamentary parties. Our equivalent is legislative 
fractionalisation, again as defined by Rae and found in the DPI. Volkerink and de 
Haan provide a third measure of legislative fragmentation for which we have no 
equivalent. This is the political fragmentation of parliament, which takes into 
account the distance between parties on a ten-point left-right scale. No such scale 
is available for our non-OECD states, largely for the very good reason that in 
                                                 
2 The Canadian measures are derived from a dataset kindly provided by 
Matthew Kerby of Memorial University. The UK and Spanish measures come 
from Keesing’s Contemporary Archive (http://www.keesings.com/) and Keesing’s 
Record of World Events 
 (http://www.keesings.com/keesings_record_of_world_events).  
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most of them it cannot be assumed that the Western left-right scale is a 
dominant, or even important, dimension of party competition. 
The third group of variables relates to the political fragmentation of 
government. This aims not just to capture the number and relative size of 
decision-makers but also the level of dissensus between them. For Volkerink and 
de Haan this is the equivalent of the previous measure (political fragmentation of 
parliament) and is again based upon the left-right scale, which is unavailable and 
inapplicable for us. Our equivalent uses a nominal, as opposed to a scale, 
measure of political differences. The DPI codes the party types of the three 
largest governing parties. Multiple left, centre, right, and rural parties were 
counted as one type. Multiple regional and nationalist parties were counted 
separately, on the assumption that more often than not multiple parties in these 
categories will represent different nations or regions. The different religions were 
counted as separate types, with the category of “not specified” also counted as a 
separate religion. Once we had identified the number of seats held by the 
different types of governing parties, we once again applied Rae’s 
fractionalisation index. This measure takes into account the various and multiple 
dimensions of party competition across the globe. Volkerink and de Haan’s 
second measure of political fragmentation is the maximum ideological distance 
between governing parties. This measure is again unavailable and inappropriate. 
Therefore, we provide no equivalent. While these measures do target interrelated 
phenomena their correlations are well short of the norm for potential severe 
mulicollinearity. 
Volkerink and de Haan control for GDP growth and the change in actual 
debt-servicing costs. Since the latter measure is unavailable for our sample, we 
substitute inflation (XZF-IFS from the IMF). We use the same dependent 
variable: the budget surplus as a proportion of GDP (ZF-IFS from the IMF).  
We add several controls appropriate to more diverse sets of states than 
those contained in Volkerink and de Haan’s narrow OECD sample (Persson and 
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Tabellini 2004; Woo 2003). The new variables are the log of GDP per capita, 
openness (exports and imports over GDP), log of population, the proportion of 
population between 15 and 64 and the proportion of population at 65 or over. All 
are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators except GDP, 
which is taken from the Penn World Tables. GDP is used to control for the 
potential effects of economic underdevelopment on the budget.  Poor countries 
may have relatively inefficient tax and spending systems and therefore be more 
susceptible to budget deficits. Since Cameron (1978) openness has often been 
shown to be associated with larger government (Cameron 1978) but there is 
disagreement as to whether it increases or decreases the deficit. Rodrik (1998) 
argues that the economic vulnerability associated with openness increases the 
demand for social insurance, thereby increasing the deficit. In contrast, Goode  
(1984) suggests that openness offers an opportunity for revenue generation 
through the taxing of trade, thereby decreasing the deficit. Alesina and Wacziarg 
have argued that government spending is influenced by country size, which 
determines the scope of economies of scale and the heterogeneity of voters’ 
preferences (1998). Lower deficits should be associated with a larger working age 
population due to a potentially larger taxable income. Larger deficits are 
hypothesized to be associated with older populations because of health and 
social welfare spending. 
 
4. Testing the OECD model 
 
Volkerink and de Haan’s dataset contains observations from all “old” OECD 
countries (less Luxembourg) between 1971 and 1996. We proceed to compare our 
dataset to that of Volkerink and de Haan. We use an overlap sample, thereby 
excluding the pre-1975 observations of Volkerink and de Haan and the post-
1996, new OECD, non-OECD and Luxembougian observations of our own 
sample. We begin with an equivalent model, which employs all of Volkerink and 
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de Haan’s variables for which we were able to measure equivalents for our 
model.3  Given the length of the panels in this sample, we can employ 
straightforward OLS with a lagged dependent variable. We include dummies for 
country effects and two periods of 11 years each. 
Firstly, we replicated Volkerink and de Haan’s model on their dataset, 
while restricting the sample to those countries and years that were also included 
in our dataset. As Table 1 shows, the overlap sample and equivalent model with 
lagged dependent variable reproduces the chief result of Volkerink and de Haan 
(Volkerink and de Haan 2001): the greater the number of spending ministers, the 
lower the budget surplus; the greater the level of excess seats, the higher the 
surplus. Consistent with their results, the other measures of fragmented 
government are insignificant when included in the full model. Next, we move on 
to testing the model on our data.  Again, the observations are those shared by 
both datasets. In Table 2, we present results of the Volkerink and de Haan model 
run on our own data and measures. None of the political fragmentation 
measures is significant. Also in Table 2, we run our own model, with its 
expanded set of socio-economic controls, on the overlap sample in our dataset. 
The number of spending ministers is significant and in the right direction. 
                                                 
3 We also tested all the fragmentation variables one-by-one for all of the models 
shown below. For the model in Table 5, we included each fragmentation variable 
and its interaction with political institutionalization. Also, since they are 
emphasized by Volkerink and de Haan, we tested Spending Ministers and 
Excess Seats together without the other three measures. These procedures 
produced only one variation in our results. In the OLS column of Table 5, 
Legislative fractionalization was insignificant and its interaction was only 
significant at the ten per cent level. However, both these variables remained 
highly significant in the more rigorous GMM version of this model. 
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Overall, these are very similar results to those of Volkerink and de Haan and 
reassure us that our measures represent the literature accurately. 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
Substantively, these results provide some evidence for Volkerink and de 
Haan’s positive but limited finding of the relevance of the fragmented 
government effects in the OECD. The relevance of spending ministers is 
confirmed. Methodologically, these results suggest that our global measures are 
similar enough to those used in the literature restricted to the OECD to 
reproduce the same results when used in equivalent models and samples. 
In Table 3, we present the results for the whole sample, adding on the 
Czech Republic, Luxembourg and the ten non-OECD countries. We have 
removed 19 observations where the budget surplus or deficit exceeded 10 per 
cent.4 Since several of the non-OECD panels are relatively short, we test the 
robustness of our OLS results by presenting GMM estimates according to the 
Arellano-Bond (1991) procedure. For this global sample, none of the measures of 
fragmented government approaches statistical significance in either OLS or 
GMM equations. In other studies, the economic and demographic controls we 
have included facilitated the isolation of significant political effects. In the OECD 
equations reported above, including the Volkerink and de Haan replication, our 
political variables were able to reproduce the literature’s finding that a larger 
number of spending ministers increases the budget deficit. Our sample adds 
twelve countries and 252 observations to Volkerink and de Haan’s authoritative 
work on the OECD. It does so while defining the population in such a way that 
we can be confident of the applicability of the institutional measures of 
government fragmentation. Thus, we think our failure to reject the null 
hypothesis for the global sample is a robust finding. 
                                                 
4 All twelve extreme deficits are from Israel and all seven extreme surpluses are 
from Botswana. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
5. Institutionalisation 
 
As a whole, the literature suggests that findings on political fragmentation are 
sensitive to the measurement of variables and the inclusion of countries in the 
sample. We have shown that our variables can produce similar results to 
Volkerink and de Haan’s in an equivalent sample. However, when extended to a 
new sample, even with a wide range of socio-economic controls, the significance 
of political fragmentation disappears. Thus, the difference between the two 
samples may be political rather than socio-economic. Our measures of political 
fragmentation are institutional. Therefore, we investigate whether political 
fragmentation matters differently according to the level of institutionalisation of 
a democracy. The greater the level of institutionalisation, the greater the extent to 
which formal institutions structure politics. The more institutionalised a 
democracy the more important we expect political fragmentation effects to be. 
Our proxy for institutionalisation is democratic age, specifically the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since (re-)democratisation (Clague et al 
1996, 253; Keefer 2005, 14).5 Our understanding of young democracies has a lot in 
common with that of Keefer. He emphasises that politicians in young 
democracies are less able to make broadly credible promises to voters. Instead, 
they are only credible when they make very narrow clientelist promises. This 
                                                 
5 For those countries that were not classified as democracies in 1975 by Freedom 
House, we begin counting at the year they achieve this classification. For all 
others, we assume that democratization took place in 1950, except for Barbados, 
which we take to have been democratic since independence in 1966. Since we 
have taken the log of democratic age, the fact that we have truncated the age of 
several of our democracies makes little difference.   
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means that legislative parties, parties in government and ministries in 
government are not the fundamental measures of fragmentation in such a 
political system and do not define the number of actors with access to the 
common pool. However, as the democracy ages, it institutionalises.  Increasingly, 
institutions become valid measures of fragmentation and define the number of 
actors that must co-ordinate to manage the common pool. 
In Table 4, we proceed to test the power of this institutionalisation 
argument by incorporating a measure of the years of democracy in our equation, 
and interacting it with each of our five measures of political fragmentation. Three 
political variables are significant in both the OLS and GMM equations: the age of 
the democracy, legislative fractionalisation and the interaction of age and 
fractionalisation. As the democracy ages, the budget surplus tends to increase. 
Legislative fractionalisation increases the surplus, while legislative 
fractionalisation interacted with the age of the democracy reduces the surplus. 
The second effect is much larger (by 66% if we calculate beta coefficients) and is 
consistent with our expectations. This aspect of political fragmentation matters 
more as the democracy becomes more institutionalised. In the early years of a 
democracy, institutional fragmentation does not deplete the common pool. As a 
democracy ages, and institutions become embedded, a higher number of 
instititutionally-defined actors does deplete the common pool of the central 
government budget. 
In line with previous studies, we have found that the effect of political 
fragmentation on the budget deficit is sensitive to the sample being used. 
However, in contrast to previous studies, we have provided a theoretical basis as 
to why the relevance of political fragmentation varies according to context. We 
have shown that the level of institutionalisation explains the difference between 
its performance in a sample of rich established countries and a sample of poorer 
newer democracies. 
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[Table 4 about here.] 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The logic of the common-pool resource problem has generated the so-called 
‘political fragmentation hypothesis’, whereby the number of political relevant 
actors is positively correlated with the level of the budget deficit: the greater the 
number of actors, the greater the deficit. Various models have found empirical 
support for the fragmentation hypothesis. However, these models are highly 
sensitive to political variables, sample size, time periods, and measures of the 
budget deficit itself. Moreover, to date, work on the political fragmentation 
hypothesis has been based almost entirely on evidence from OECD countries. 
In this article, we replicated an existing fragmentation model on a sample 
of OECD countries and confirmed the positive results: the size of the budget 
deficit was correlated with the number of spending ministers and the size of the 
government’s majority in the legislature. However, when we extended this 
model to include Luxembourg, the Czech Republic and non-OECD democracies, 
we found that neither measure of size fragmentation was statistically significant. 
This demonstrated, once again, that the empirical success of the political 
fragmentation is very sensitive to sample composition. In contrast to previous 
studies, though, we go further by offering an explanation of the difference in the 
findings between the two samples. Our explanatory variable is political 
institutionalisation. Variations in institutionalisation capture the extent to which 
institutions matter. We find that in the older (more institutionalised) 
democracies, legislative fractionalisation reduces the budget surplus. Therefore, 
when controlling for political context, we find that the general theory of the 
common-pool resource problem can explain variations in fiscal performance 
outside the usual set of OECD countries. 
 17 
If correct, this conclusion has important policy implications relating to the  
organization of the budget process. Based on the logic of the common-pool 
resource model and supported by empirical studies of OECD countries, there is 
evidence that a hierarchical and centrally coordinated budgetary process can 
offset some of the problems associated with fragmentation effects. Our study 
suggests that such a policy recommendation may be more appropriate in some 
contexts than others. Specifically, this recommendation may be more appropriate 
in more institutionalized countries and less so in less institutionalized non-OECD 
countries. 
 18 
Table 1. Volkerink and DeHaan dataset overlap sample 
equivalent model (OLS) 
Lagged surplus 0.7387812    (0.0351833)**    
GDP growth 0.3002017    (0.0539653)**      
Inflation 0.0299514    (0.0150971)      
Government fragmentation -0.0021409    (0.0026597)     
Ideological frag. of govt. 0.0003493    (0.0013044)      
Parliamentary fragmentation 0.0000653    (0.0013491)      
Spending ministers -0.0008763    (0.0003152)*     
Excess seats 0.0265879    (0.0136476)      
Constant -0.0138255    (0.0108602)     
No. Obs. 446 
R² 0.7819 
Notes: Period: 1975-1996 (inclusive).  Model is OLS.  This regression includes dummies for N-1 
states and a dummy the panel into dividing into two eleven-year periods.  Standard errors  (in 
parentheses) are clustered by country. 
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Table 2. ‘Our dataset’ overlap sample (OLS) 
 Volkerink and de Haan 
model 
‘Our model’ 
Surplus (lag) 0.7288117 
(0.0387533)** 
0.648946 
(0.0380914)** 
GDP growth 0.0020279 
(0.000358)** 
0.0020362 
(0.0004113)** 
Inflation -0.0001212 
(0.0001933) 
0.0002636 
(0.0001289) 
GDP pc (log) - 
0.0618672 
(0.0147118)** 
Openness - 
-0.0003348 
(0.0001462)* 
Population (log) - 
-0.0053282 
(0.0105144) 
Working age population - 
0.0003259 
(0.0009251) 
Population over working age - 
-0.0017679 
(0.0008934) 
Government fractionalisation -0.0026792 
(0.0086534) 
0.0042179 
(0.0112223) 
Political fractionalisation -0.0022629 
(0.0094119) 
-0.0097439 
(0.009918) 
Legislative fractionalisation -0.00263 
(0.0243266 ) 
-0.0244969 
(0.0338449) 
Spending ministers -0.0001363 
(0.000377) 
-0.0011416 
(0.0005257)* 
Excess seats 0.000045 
(0.0000795) 
0.0000289 
(0.0000733) 
Constant -0.0098602 
(0.0173675) 
-0.5272494 
(0.1600267)** 
No. obs. 443 443 
R² 0.738 0.757 
Notes: Period: 1975-1996 (inclusive).  Dummies for N-1 states and a dummy dividing the panels into two eleven-year 
periods are included in all regressions.  Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country. * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3. Global Sample 
 OLS GMM 
Lagged surplus 
0.321326 
(0.070568)** 
0.003851 
(0.164999) 
GDP growth 
0.045812 
(0.024369) 
0.036787 
(0.017919)* 
Inflation 
0.007739 
(0.001183)** 
0.015781 
(0.015611) 
GDP per capita (log) 
0.861441 
(0.514574) 
3.396473 
(1.672466)* 
Openness 
0.002909 
(0.006298) 
-0.006424 
(0.010308) 
Population (log) 
-0.239455 
(0.108539)* 
1.588479 
(2.227929) 
Population (15-64) 
0.002693 
(0.054534) 
0.087336 
(0.102567) 
Population (65 plus) 
-0.037852 
(0.046280) 
-0.098375 
(0.080972) 
Government fractionalisation 
-0.063633 
(0.350545) 
-0.376454 
(0.403475) 
Political fractionalisation 
-0.155009 
(0.257410) 
-0.216160 
(0.242959) 
Legislative fractionalisation 
-0.008314 
(1.291967) 
3.487557 
(1.827505) 
Spending ministers 
-0.003178 
(0.015908) 
-0.016117 
(0.025137) 
Excess seats 
0.000769 
(0.001742) 
0.000695 
(0.001698) 
Constant 
-6.799940 
(4.810742) 
-0.061642 
(0.029795)* 
No. obs. 721 649 
R² 0.68 - 
2nd Order test - 0.2873 
Notes: Notes: Period: 1975-2004 (inclusive). Dummies for N-1 countries and two 
dummies dividing panels into three ten-year periods are included in all regressions. 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country in OLS. * significant at 
5%; ** significant at 1%. 2nd order test is a P-value for rejecting the null hypothesis 
that there is no second order correlation in the first-difference residuals. 
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Table 4. Global Sample with Institutionalisation 
 OLS GMM 
Lagged surplus 
0.286719 
(0.067105)** 
-0.007057 
(0.137685) 
GDP growth 
0.049531 
(0.025046) 
0.037363 
(0.019835) 
Inflation 
0.006773 
(0.001142)** 
0.012536 
(0.015413) 
GDP per capita (log) 
0.476686 
(0.485656) 
2.149774 
(1.342903) 
Openness 
0.009005 
(0.007258) 
-0.000422 
(0.009945) 
Population (log) 
-0.305878 
(0.106751)** 
2.731416 
(1.849750) 
Population (15-64) 
-0.012183 
(0.053249) 
0.046405 
(0.067036) 
Population (65 plus) 
-0.014052 
(0.037458) 
0.090151 
(0.065073) 
Government fractionalisation 
1.005341 
(1.652241) 
-0.377070 
(2.571864) 
Political fractionalisation 
-5.135380 
(2.809330) 
-4.575895 
(3.441017) 
Legislative fractionalisation 
11.232288 
(5.061100)* 
28.732208 
(9.626791)** 
Spending ministers 
0.057424 
(0.112889) 
0.093608 
(0.149756) 
Excess seats 
0.017074 
(0.016217) 
0.016960 
(0.010511) 
Years of Democracy (log) 
2.664271 
(1.074375)* 
4.784122 
(1.898319)* 
Yrs. of Demo. * Gov. Frac. 
-0.291134 
(0.440554) 
0.007135 
(0.761048) 
Yrs. of Demo. * Pol. Frac. 
1.518393 
(0.813888) 
1.272336 
(1.000629) 
Yrs. of Demo. * Leg. Frac. 
-3.630929 
(1.432647)* 
-7.739575 
(2.637629)** 
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Yrs. of Demo. * No. of Mins. 
-0.019479 
(0.033321) 
0.020630 
(0.043839) 
Yrs. of Demo. * Excess Seats 
-0.005132 
(0.004745) 
-0.004550 
(0.002990) 
Constant 
-10.633789 
(5.475545) 
0.045949 
(0.023622) 
No. obs. 721 649 
R² 0.69 - 
2nd Order test - 0.3515 
Notes: Notes: Period: 1975-2004 (inclusive).  Dummies for N-1 countries and two dummies 
dividing panels into three ten-year periods are included in all regressions. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered by country in OLS. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. 2nd order test is a P-value for rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no second order 
correlation in the first-difference residuals. 
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